An incentive model of corruption in the Mediterranean and Balkan region by Rontos, Konstantinos et al.
Int. J Latest Trends Fin. Eco. Sc.                                                     Volume 2 Issue 2 June, 2012 
99 
An Incentive Model of Corruption in the 
Mediterranean and Balkan Region 
Konstantinos Rontos1, Petros Sioussiouras2, Ioannis S. Vavouras3 
1 Department of Sociology, University of the Aegean 
Mytilene, Lesvos, Greece 
k.rontos@soc.aegean.gr 
2 Department of Shipping, Trade and Transport, University of the Aegean 
Chios, Greece 
siou@aegean.gr 
3 Department of Public Administration, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences 
Syngrou Avenue 136, Athens, 17671, Greece 
vavouras@panteion.gr 
 
Abstract - The study considers the determinants of 
corruption in the 23 Mediterranean and Balkan countries 
where it is widely recognized that this phenomenon is 
widespread. Starting from the general hypothesis that the 
extent of corruption in any country is a combination of 
motives and opportunities, our scope is to examine the 
most important economic, political and social factors that 
determine corruption in this region. We accept that 
motives are determined by the level of human 
development, while opportunities by the degree of 
government effectiveness, which in turn is determined by 
the level of economic development and the existing 
political system. We show that the level of corruption is 
affected by the degree of human development, while the 
degree of government effectiveness affects crucially the 
level of corruption. On its turn, government effectiveness 
is mainly determined by the level of economic 
development and the existing political system. Improving 
government effectiveness, increasing the levels of human 
and economic development and establishing a more 
democratic political system form therefore the pillars of 
any anticorruption strategies in these countries. 
Keywords - Corruption motives; Corruption 
opportunities; Governance; Political rights; Human 
development; Balkans; Mediterranean countries. 
 
1. Introduction 
The fact that whoever is in a place to exercise 
power may be in the position to use public office for 
personal gain, has been acknowledged from the first 
stages of human civilization (Caiden, 2001) or from 
the very first instances of organized human life 
(Klitgaard, 1988). Although the phenomenon of 
corruption dates as back as the very beginning of 
human existence, it is only in the last decades that i  
has become a major concern for theoretical and 
empirical research. The most significant reasons for 
this are the end of the cold war that reduced the 
geopolitical importance of many regions considered 
as corrupted and intensified pressures upon 
international aid, the increased global liberalization 
and integration and the shifts in the ways the public 
and the private sectors are viewed (Johnston, 2005). 
While the private sector is also affected by 
corruption1, the vast bulk of economic literature 
examines only public sector corruption for two main 
reasons. First, the phenomenon is mainly associated 
with the public sector. In this context corruption is 
considered as a disease of public power and an 
indication of bad governance (Tiihonen, 2003). 
Second, widely accepted private sector corruption 
indices have not yet been constructed, rendering 
empirical research on the issue extremely difficult.  
Public sector corruption is usually defined as 
the abuse of public power, office or authority for 
private benefit, interest or gain (World Bank, 1997; 
Tanzi, 1998, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1999)2. 
Corruption can take up several facets, such as 
bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion and 
nepotism (Amundsen, 1999). It must be admitted 
however that corruption is a deeply normative 
concept and its definitions are a matter of long-
running debate (Johnston, 2005). It should be 
pointed out that corruption does not always relate to 
personal gain. More often than not, the benefited 
                                                 
1 Private sector corruption, which manifests itself in 
various forms -such as the adoption of “bad practices”- by 
many large privately owned corporations in relation t  the 
transparency of their data, publishing false accounting 
statements and the deception of stock-holders are 
extremely hard to measure, and there are no indicators 
allowing international comparisons. [For an analysis of 
private sector corruption see Transparency Internatio l 
(2009)]. As a result, the study of this phenomenon is 
limited to the public sphere.  
2 A definition that covers corruption in sectors, public and 
the private, is the misuse of trusted power for own profit 
(Transparency International, 2011). 
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from the phenomenon are the so-called third parties, 
namely families, friends or political parties. It has 
been established that in many countries the proceeds 
from corruption end up in financing political 
parties3.  
The determining factors of corruption are 
numerous. The most important ones according to the 
relevant theoretical and empirical research are the 
level of economic development (Lalountas, 
Manolas, and Vavouras, 2011), the level of poverty 
and the degree of income inequality (Salvatore, 
2004; Salvatore, 2007), the specific type of political 
authority, the quality of governance, the quality of 
the institutional framework (Salinas-Jiménez and 
Salinas-Jiménez, 2007), the degree of globalization 
(Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo and Bussolo, 2001), the 
level of competition, the structure and the size of 
public sector, the cultural qualities, the geographic 
location and history (Goel and Nelson, 2010; 
Rontos, Sioussiouras, and Vavouras, 2012)4. 
Widespread corruption largely unveils the existence 
of institutional and political weaknesses as well as 
economic and social underdevelopment. It is 
recognized that corruption may be the single most 
significant barrier to both democratization and 
economic development (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
The analysis of corruption should not focus 
exclusively on its economic, political and social 
aspects. The general attitude towards this 
phenomenon is also determined by the prevailing 
system of individual behavioral and moral attributes, 
since not all people facing the same socioeconomic 
environment are equally prone to corruption 
exhibiting identical opportunistic behavior. 
However, the phenomenon seems to depend less on 
the individual psychological or personality 
characteristics of public employees and more on the 
cultural, institutional and political basis on whic the 
specific nation is constructed (Sung, 2002), not 
ignoring of course and the level of its economic 
development. The extent of corruption varies 
therefore among countries and because corruption 
operates in a certain cultural and political context 
that influences its growth (Benson and Cullen, 
1998). In the end corruption could be considered 
rather as a social problem than a problem of human 
nature (Bracking, 2007). And as a social problem it 
is inevitable but variable as well, while it is 
                                                 
3 See relevant analysis in Tanzi (2000).  
4 For an analysis of the determinant factors of corruption 
see among others Lambsdorff (2006) and Treisman 
(2000). 
evaluated in terms of structure, process and resultant 
(Girling, 1997). 
Generally, the determinants of corruption could 
be distinguished between those that affect the 
motivations or incentives of agents to engage in 
corruption and those that create opportunities for 
corrupt activities (Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del 
Granado and Boex, 2007). The opportunities 
available for corruption in various societies are 
mainly the product of economic and political forces. 
It is on this theoretical background that we develop 
our theoretical and empirical model of public sector 
corruption in the Mediterranean and Balkan region. 
Referring to the analysis of the phenomenon of 
corruption, the most important issue that has emerged 
in the recent decades is the relation between 
corruption and economic development. In this 
context, corruption is considered to be a cause as well 
as a consequence of poverty. In a sense, corruption is 
a deficiency that is responsible for low levels of 
economic development by reducing the chances for 
long-term economic growth (Lambsdorff, 2007; Aidt, 
2009). It should also be pointed out that it is 
commonly accepted that corruption is a barrier to the 
implementation of the necessary for development 
political, economic and social reforms (Transparency 
International, 2008). The extent, however, of the 
consequences corruption has on economic 
development is largely determined by the existing 
institutional framework (de Vaal & Ebben, 2011). On
another account, corruption is a “disease” which is 
caused by poverty, that is controlled only when 
economies develop (Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2002). 
Hence, there is a “corruption transition” (Gundlach 
and Paldam, 2008). 
The direction of causality between corruption 
and per capita income as an approximation of the 
level of economic development has already been 
under scrutiny in relevant empirical literature. Recent 
studies show that the direction of causality is mainly 
from income towards corruption. In this manner, one
can reach the conclusion that the levels of corruption 
become lower when countries become richer and that 
there can be a transition from poverty to honesty and 
straightforwardness (Gundlach and Paldam, 2008). 
However, corruption control should not be considere 
as a “luxury good” that citizens demand automatically 
once their average income reaches a certain level. It is 
achieved only through the adoption and the efficient 
implementation of the appropriate long-run policies. 
Moreover, we must point out that corruption is 
extensive in low income countries, not because their 
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inhabitants present a natural proclivity towards the
said phenomenon, but because the conditions of life 
make them prone to that (Lalountas et al., 2011). That 
is it is not because people in low income countries ar  
more corruptible than their counterparts in high 
income countries, but it is simply because conditions 
in poor countries are more conducive for the growth 
of corruption (Myint, 2000). The motive for the 
increase of personal income is indeed intense and is 
becoming more so due to widespread poverty and the 
low salaries of the public sector (Gray and Kaufmann, 
1998). In low income economies, corruption can 
prove to be a “survival strategy” (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999).  
It is also widely accepted that the political 
system and the phenomenon of corruption are closely 
related. Corruption is widely considered to be both a 
symptom and a cause for the malfunctioning of 
democratic institutions (Warren, 2004). According to 
the mainstream view political development and, 
especially, democracy prove restrictive for the 
proliferation of corruption, especially political 
corruption, mainly because of the competition they s t 
as a precondition for the acquisition of political office, 
which in turn presupposes widespread democratic 
participation. In a sense, the political system or the
“political macrostructure” is responsible for 
determining the political motivation of all players in a 
state system and it is the very reaction of these factors 
that determines the behavior of state bureaucracy 
(Lederman, Loayza and Soares, 2005). As a result, a 
highly developed and well-functioning democracy 
serves to block the spread of corruption (Zhang, Cao
and Vaughn, 2009). 
The relevant empirical analysis has established 
the view that democracy reduces corruption, without 
necessarily immediate results. A long democratic 
period seems to be a determining factor for reducing 
the scale of corruption (Treisman, 2000). In this 
sense, one can easily assume that it is the democratic 
tradition or the time exposure to democracy and not 
just the adoption of a democratic regime that reducs 
corruption. Besides, limited forms of democracy do 
not seem to affect corruption5. It is only after a certain 
level that democratic practices seem to contribute to 
corruption control (Montinola and Jackman, 2002)6. 
                                                 
5 According to certain empirical analyses, limited 
democratic regimes are associated with higher levels of 
corruption compared to autocratic regimes. See 
relevant presentation in Lambsdorff (2006). 
6 For an analysis of the correlation between democracy 
and corruption see Vavouras, Manolas and Sirmali (2010). 
We argue that the level of economic 
development and the existing political system 
establish the degree of government effectiveness that 
determines the opportunities open to corruption 
activities in a given country. Government 
effectiveness generally refers to governance quality 
and performance or to the degree that the public 
sector achieves the objectives it is supposed to meet. 
We accept moreover that corruption is also 
affected by the level of human development that 
determines the motives to engage in corruption 
activities. Human development is defined as the 
process of enlarging or expanding people’s choices 
(UNDP, 1990). That is human development refers to 
the expansion of people’s freedoms and capabilities 
to live their lives as they choose (UNDP, 2009)7. 
The most critical of these choices are to leave a long
and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent 
standard of living. We argue that the chances open 
to individuals to live a long and healthy life, their 
accessibility to knowledge and their expectations to 
enjoy a decent standard of living define their 
corruption boundaries. However, it is sometimes 
suggested that there are some potential feedback 
links between corruption and human development or 
even that the opposite direction of causality might 
also exist. That is the level of human development 
could be affected by corruption as well, if we accept 
that corruption reduces the rate of economic growth 
and government expenditure on education and 
health, factors that exert negative influence on 
standards of living, life expectancy and human 
capital accumulation (Akçay, 2006). 
The scope of the present paper is to examine the 
above opportunities and motives as the main causes of 
corruption in the Mediterranean and Balkan region. 
Our analysis focuses on the study of the impacts that 
government effectiveness and human development 
have on corruption in this region, while we accept tha
government effectiveness is mainly determined by the 
level of economic development and the existing 
political system.  
Our analysis shows that in this region 
government effectiveness is actually the most 
important determining factor of corruption and that 
this factor is indeed determined by the level of 
economic development and the existing political 
system. As a result improving government 
effectiveness, increasing the levels of human and 
economic development and establishing a more 
                                                 
7 For an analysis of the evolution of the definitions of 
human development, see in Alkire (2010). 
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democratic political system form the pillars of any 
anticorruption strategies in the Mediterranean and 
Balkan region, given the fact that the countries 
belonging to this region are characterized by lack of 
homogeneity as far as the level of their economic 
development and their extent of democratic 
institutions.  
 
2. Methodology, data and analysis 
2.1. Model specification 
Following the analysis presented above, we argue 
that the most important factors that determine corruption 
are government effectiveness and human development, 
while government effectiveness is determined by the lev l 
of economic development and the existing political 
system.  
We must point out at this stage that it seems that 
there is a strong correlation between two of the sel ct d 
independent variables, namely between human 
development and economic development, since the levl
of economic development determines to a large extent the 
level of human development8. This multicollinearity 
problem reveals a difficulty to model effectively the 
factors that determine corruption by using OLS method of 
one equation, that is in the case that we would consider 
and the four explanatory variables as independent. Mainly 
for this reason we use a two equation model. 
Very often the complexity of the real world is better 
explained by quantitative techniques which employ more 
than one relationship among the involved variables.  In 
fact the real word could be effectively explained by a 
model with numerous well defined equations 
simultaneously existing. Of course a great number of 
equations causes problems to the logical explanatio of the 
phenomenon through the model results. Problems of this 
kind are more serious when prediction is the target of the 
model’s construction. 
To express corruption, the corruption perceptions 
index (CPI) is used as a predicted variable. The CPI is an 
international index measured annually by the 
nongovernmental organization Transparency Internatio l 
(2010) for 178 countries or regions. CPI is the most 
extensively used index for relevant empirical studies. It is 
a composite indicator, based on a variety of data derived 
from 13 different surveys carried out by 10 independent 
and reputable organizations. It measures corruption in a 
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents the highest possible 
corruption level, while as the scale increases there is the 
perception that corruption does not exist in a given 
country. Despite the fact that the index is not the outcome 
of an objective quantitative measurement of corruption, it 
                                                 
8 The appearance of a strong correlation between these 
independent variables is examined in Rontos et al. (2012).  
is of great importance since it reveals how this 
phenomenon is being perceived. 
 To express government effectiveness the relevant 
World Bank government effectiveness indicator (GE) is 
used. This indicator is very useful because it aims at 
capturing the quality of public services provided, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment to such policies 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). The aim of the
indicator is therefore to capture the capacity of the public 
sector to implement sound policies. GE is one of the six 
composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance, 
the so called worldwide governance indicators (WGI) 
covering over 200 countries since 1996 and produced by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (World Bank, 2010b). 
The values of GE lie between -2.5 and 2.5. Actually, the 
variable has been transformed to a standard normal one 
(with mean 0 and standard deviation 1), so that cross-
country and over time differences in the measurement 
scale are avoided. Higher values correspond to better 
governance. Although this indicator measures subjective 
perceptions regarding government effectiveness and it is 
not the outcome of a quantitative objective measurement, 
it is of a great importance since it reveals how government 
effectiveness is being perceived. 
As a summary measure of the level of human 
development we use the non-income value of the human 
development index (HDI). The HDI is estimated by the 
UNDP (2010) and it measures the average achievements 
in a given country in three dimensions of human 
development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge 
and a decent standard of living. It is a composite index 
with life expectancy in birth, mean years of schooling, 
expected years of schooling and gross national income 
(GNI) per capita as its main components. Since there is a 
strong correlation between HDI and GNI per capita which 
is included in the model as a separate explanatory variable, 
we use the non-income HDI value as it is estimated by 
UNDP. Despite its inherent limitations this index is a 
useful comparative measure of the level of human 
development. According to HDI countries are classified in 
three categories: High human development if the value of 
the index is higher than 0.800, medium human 
development if the value of the index is between 0.50  and 
0.799 and low human development, if the value of the 
index is lower than 0.500.  
The level of economic development is approximated 
by gross national income (GNI) per capita in thousand 
US$. The World Bank (2010a) data for GNI per capita in 
US$ are used. GNI per capita is the gross national income 
converted to US$ using the World Bank Atlas method, 
divided by the midyear population9. 
                                                 
9 For the methodology used to estimate GNI per capita, see 
World Bank (2011). 
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The existing political system is approximated by the
political rights index (PR). PR is a measure of the 
democracy level in each country as it is estimated by the 
organization Freedom House (2011). The PR index is an 
extensively used index for the measurement of democracy. 
The index measures from 1, which ranks a country as very 
free, up to 7, which ranks a country as not free. Fr edom 
House classifies countries according to PR in 3 categori s 
adopted in the present study: free countries (F) with score 
1-3 in the 1-7 scale, partly free countries (PF) with score 
4-5 in the 1-7 scale and not free countries (NF) with score 
6-7 in the 1-7 scale. 
The values of all the variables used in the model are 
presented in table 1. 
 



































Albania         3.3 3 4 0.787 -0,2 




3.2 4 4.70 0.771 -0.65 
Bulgaria       3.6 2 6.06 0.795 0.142 
Croatia         4.1 1 13.72 0.798 0.639 
Cyprus          6.3 1 26.94 0.84 1.32 
Egypt           3.1 6 2.07 0.657 -0.3 
France          6.8 1 42.62 0.898 1.442 
FYROM       4.1 3 4.40 0.742 -0.14 
Greece          3.5 1 29.04 0.89 0.608 
Israel          6.1 1 25.79 0.916 1.095 
Italy           3.9 1 35.11 0.882 0.517 
Kosovo         2.8 5 3.24         
… 
-0.5 
Lebanon         2.5 5 8.06          
... 
-0.67 
Libya           2.2 7 12.02 0.775 -1.12 
Malta           5.6 1 16.69 0.85 1.11 
Monteneg
ro      
3.7 3 6.65 0.825 -0.03 
Morocco          3.4 5 2.77 0.594 -0.11 
Serbia          3.5 2 6.00 0.788 -0.15 
Spain         6.1 1 32.12 0.897 0.936 
Syria           2.5 7 2.41 0.627 -0.61 
Tunisia         4.3 7 3.72 0.729 0.414 
Turkey          4.4 3 8.72 0.679 0.352 
Notes: CPI = Corruption Perceptions Index, PR = 
Political Rights, GNI pc = Gross National Income per 
capita, HDI = Human Development Index, GE = 
Government Effectiveness. 
Sources: CPI: Transparency International (2010). 
PR: Freedom House (2011). GNI pc: World Bank (2010a). 
HDI: UNDP (2010). GE: World Bank (2010b).  
 
Following the analysis of the behavioural 
equations and the definitions of the variables used, 
the following two equation model is developed to 
interpret corruption opportunities and motives in the
Mediterranean and Balkan region, assuming at this 
stage that government effectiveness itself is affected 
by the level of corruption: 
 
CPI = f (GE, HDI)            (1)  
and 
GE = f (GNI, PR, CPI)      (2) 
 
The first equation denotes the hypothesis that 
CPI is affected by GE as a measure of the 
opportunities provided to participate in corruption 
activities and the non-income HDI as a measure of 
the motives to participate in these activities. The 
second equation expresses the tendency of GE to 
depend on GNI, PR and possibly to CPI itself. The 
2-stage least squares method is used to run the above 
system of equations. 
 
2.2. Estimation results 
Each of the endogenous variables of the model, 
CPI and GE, are predicted by the exogenous variables 
GNI, PR and HDI. Then we run equations 1 and 2 by 
using the predicted, in the first stage, CPI and GE. 
Stepwise method is used. According to that procedure, the 
following equations are predicted: 
 
CPI = 2.694 + 1.511 GE + 1.231 HDI  (R2 = 0.512)           
(1) 
and   
GE = 1.245 + 0.035 GNI – 0.196 PR – 
0.218 CPI   (R2 = 0.706)                                      (2) 
 
Examining the 1st equation we can conclude 
that the b coefficients of both independent variables 
have signs in the expected direction suggesting that 
the higher the government effectiveness (GE) and 
the higher the human development (HDI) in the 
countries concerned, the lower the perceived level of 
corruption (the higher the corruption index) and the
lower the GE and HD the lower the corruption. 
In the 2nd equation, the b coefficients of GNI 
and PR are in the expected direction, implying that
the higher the GNI per capita and the PR (the lower 
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the PR index), the higher the GE and the lower the 
GNI per capita and the PR, the lower the GE. The b 
coefficient of CPI however is not in the right 
direction as it indicates that the higher the corruption 
(the lower the CPI) the higher the GE and the lower 
the corruption the lower the GE. This economic 
insignificance is probably due to the fact that to run
a more accurate regression model with 3 
independent variables a larger number than 23 cases 
should exist. 
This inconvenience leads us to run equation 2 
again, rejecting CPI variable from the model. In that 
way the final model is the following: 
 
CPI = 2.694 + 1.511 GE* + 1.231 HDI         
(R2 = 0.512)                                                   (1)  
GE = 0.347 + 0.024 GNI* – 0.156 PR*    
(R2 = 0.701)                                   (2a) 
* Statistical significance at 0.05 level. 
 
In the last model CPI and GE constitute the 
endogenous variables of the system that depend 
overall on GNI, PR and HDI. 
The variables GE, GNI and PR present 
statistical significance at 0.05 level. HDI does not 
present a significance of this kind, but we keep the 
variable in the model as our case is not a sample of 
countries, but all the population of the 
Mediterranean and Balkan countries, a fact that 
renders inference procedures of a lower interest. In 
fact we prefer the statistical significance of b’s to be 
one of the criteria for rejecting the variables butno  
the main reason for that. What we suggest is that as 
the variable adds to the percentage of the explained 
variation of the dependent variable we keep it in the 
model. Overlapping the typical limits of statistical 
significance in models with cross-country variables, 
which are in fact composite indicators, is suggested 
in relative methodological papers as an approach 
reflecting “the reality that available data are proxies 
for the concepts that we try to measure” (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). Normality and linearity 
tests as well tests for homoscedasticity, 
autocorrelation and multicollenearity problems are 
provided in the following for equations 1 and 2a. 
Equation 1: 
The equation has a quite good total explanatory 
performance, as the coefficient of determination R2 
GE, HDI = 51.2 %. GE is the first explanatory variable 
entering to the model, explaining the most of the 
dependent’s variation (R2 GE
 = 50.9 %). HDI enters 
as a second variable adding just 0.3 % to the 
explanatory capacity of the model. 
The normality of the studentized deleted 
residuals is not violated as they present a skewness 
statistic equal to -0.087 with Std. Error = 0.481 (Sk. 
Stat/ Std. Error = 0.18<2) and kurtosis statistic equal 
to -0.351 with Std. Error = 0.935 (Kur. Stat/ Std. 
Error = 0.38<2).  The skewness and kurtisis statistics 
for unstandardized residuals are similar. 
Additionally, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test verifies the 
normality of residuals (K-S statistic = 0.108, df = 23, 
p = 0.20 > 0.05). Linearity is assumed to exist 









Correlation CPI GE HDI 
CPI 1.000 0.714* 0.582* 
GE  1.000 0.769* 
HDI   1.000 
* Statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
 
Additionally, a relatively strong correlation 
between independent variables appears (table 2), a 
fact that indicates the existence of possible 
multicollinearity problems. Tolerance statistics is 
not too low (0.409) and VIF is not too high (VIF = 
2.447 < 10) for all independent variables, indicating 
no serious multicollinearity problems. The 
conditional index for the last dimension is 29.89 < 
30, a result confirming the above findings (table 3). 
On the opposite side are the rest 2 collinearity 
diagnostics of table 3. Eigenvalue is almost 0, and
the variance proportions in last dimension is high, 
both indicating the existence of multicollinearity 
problems.  
 















Constant GE HDI 
1 1 1.37 1.00 0.31 0.31   
  2 0.63 1.48 0.69 0.69   
2 1 2.26 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 
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  2 0.74 1.75 0.00 0.39 0.00 
  3 0.00 29.89 1.00 0.58 1.00 
* Dependent variable: CPI. 
 
 
The Durbin-Watson test did not indicate 
autocorrelation as d = 1.973 > du = 1.54 and 4-d = 2.03 > 
du = 1.54 with explanatory variables K = 2, a = 0.05 and n 
= 23.  
65432










































Figure 1: Scatterplot of Residuals vs. Predicted Values
 
 
The homoscedasticity assumption seems also to 
be approximately followed according the scatter-plot 
in figure 1. 
 
Equation 2a: 
Equation 2a presents a very good total 
explanatory performance (R2 PR, GNI = 79.1
 %). PR is 
the first variable entering to the model, with a 
contribution of 60.9 % to the explanation of GE 
variation. GNI is entering to the model as a second 
variable with a contribution to the total R2 equal to 
9.2 %. 
The unstandardized residuals normality is 
revealed by skewness statistic (0.631 with std. error 
= 0.481 and Sk.stat/ Std Error = 1.3<2), kurtosis 
statistic (1.031 with std error = 0.935 and Kurt. Stat/ 
Std. Error = 1.1<2) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
(0.111, df = 23, p = 0.20>0.05). Studentized deleted 
residuals statistics and tests present similar results 
except the ratio Kurt/ Std. Error = 3.2 which is 
higher than the empirical limit of 2 which is 
suggested by statistics. However, Normal Q-Q plot 
for studentized deleted residuals in figure 2 do not 




















Figure 2: Normal Q-Q Plot of Studentized Deleted Residual
 
Strong linear relation seems to exist between 
independent and each of the dependent variables (table 4). 
 




Correlation GE GNI PR 
GE 1.000 0.759* -0.780* 
GNI  1.000 -0.690* 
PR   1.000 
* Statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
 
Although the correlation index between variables 
is relatively (but not very) high (rGNI, PR = -69 %< 0.70), 
tolerance statistics is high enough (0.524 for both 
independent variables), VIF = 1.91 < 10 for both variables 
and condition index = 6.844 < 15, are statistical evid nces 
that collinearity is not a concern. Eigenvalues (= 0.049 ≅ 
0) and variance proportions are the only statistics hat 
indicate possible collinearity problems (table 5). 

















stant PR GNI 
1 1 1.833 1.000 0.08 0.08   
  2 0.167 3.312 0.92 0.92   
2 1 2.303 1.000 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  2 0.648 1.885 0.00 0.10 0.21 
  3 0.049 6.844 0.98 0.87 0.76 
* Dependent variable: GE. 
The Durbin-Watson test reveals that there are 
no autocorrelation problems as d = 1.732 > du = 
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1.54 and 4-d = 2.268 > du = 1.54 with K=2, a = 0.05 
and n = 23. Finally, the homoscedasticity 
assumption seems to be followed in equation 2a as 
the scatter -plot of the expected values against the 
residuals is similar to that of figure 3. 
 




Concluding the evaluation of the 2-equations 
model predicted in the present study we could argue 
that it presents a good economic and statistical 
performance in addition to its sound theoretical 
basis. The coefficients in both equations present 
economic significance and, at the same time, 
statistical significance, with HDI as an exception n 
equation 1. As we have already explained, 
inferential statistics are not a reason to reject a 
variable because of its insignificance, as we deal 
with a population rather than a sample of cases 
(countries). The equations of the model present a 
good total explanatory performance and seem to 
follow the regression assumptions, with the 
exception of some multicollinearity problems 
revealed by only a part of diagnostic statistics.  
These results suggest to approve the model and to 
move to its further discussion.  
 
3. Conclusions and policy 
proposals 
3.1. Conclusions 
The above empirical analysis highlighted the 
most significant factors that determine the level of 
corruption in the Mediterranean and Balkan region, 
namely the level of economic development as it has 
been approached by GNI per capita, the form of the 
existing political system as it has been approached 
by the extent of political rights and the level of 
human development as it has been approached by 
the non-income value of the human development 
index. The first two variables, that is GNI per capit  
and political rights affect corruption through their 
impact on government effectiveness, which is the 
second endogenous variable of the model apart from 
corruption. 
The level of economic development is the most 
important variable that affects the degree of 
corruption in the Mediterranean and Balkan region10. 
The two variables are negatively correlated, since 
increasing GNI per capita, increases government 
effectiveness which reduces corruption. However, 
the effective control of corruption should not be 
considered as a “luxury good” that people demand 
once their incomes increase to a certain level. It is 
achieved only through the adoption and effective 
implementation of the appropriate long-run policies. 
On the other hand, corruption inhibits economic 
development since it is an obstacle to the effectiv 
implementation of the necessary to development 
political, economic and social changes. Even though 
the consequences corruption has on economic 
development depend also on the existing institutional 
framework, the direction of causality between 
corruption and per capita income -as the critical factor 
that reflects the level of development-, has not been 
entirely identified. It has been shown, nevertheless, 
that the level of corruption is an extensive one in the 
low income countries of the Mediterranean and 
Balkan region (Rontos et al., 2012). And this is 
because generally in low income countries, corruption 
is to some extent a “survival strategy”. In order to 
survive and support themselves and their families, 
low paid public sector employees may need to 
moonlight or take small bribes, especially when their 
jobs are associated with high degree of uncertainty, 
mainly due to the prevailing political instability, that 
reduces their expected incomes. And political 
instability is a characteristic of many countries in that 
region. According to this line of thought, corruption is 
a “disease” caused by poverty, or a by-product of 
poverty that diminishes only with economic 
development.  
As far as the character of corruption is 
concerned, it could be argued that the main 
difference between developed and developing 
countries is that the former are characterized by 
“grand” or “upper-level”  corruption and the latter 
are ridden with “petty” or “lower-level” corruption. 
                                                 
10 See relevant analysis in Rontos et al. (2012). 
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Grand corruption is that form of corruption that 
pervades the highest levels of government 
engendering major abuses of power, while petty 
corruption involves the exchange of very small 
amounts of money and the granting of small favors 
(UN, 2004). The first form of corruption, often 
described as “political”, is generally associated with 
high-level politicians or government officials and is 
realized at the stage of policymaking and usually 
takes the form of economic scandals involving large 
sums of money. This systemic corruption can 
undermine state legitimacy and economic 
functioning (Rose-Ackerman, 2006). The second, 
often described as “bureaucratic” or 
“administrative”, relates to the implementation stage 
of state functions by lower level government 
employees at their regular interact with the public 
and usually takes the form of small bribes, widely 
described as “speed money”, and favors. The last 
form of corruption is also described as “needs-
based” or “survival” corruption (UNDP, 2008). It 
could be argued that this basic distinction of 
corruption applies also to the developed and 
developing Mediterranean and Balkan countries. 
The extent of political rights is the second 
variable that affects the degree of corruption in the
Mediterranean and Balkan region. Generally, the 
more open the democracy is in a country the more the 
phenomenon of corruption is limited in this country. 
Corruption could therefore be considered both as a 
symptom of and as a cause for the malfunctioning of 
democratic institutions. On the other hand political 
development and democracy can reduce corruption. 
However, the transition form an autocratic to a 
democratic political regime does not constitute the
critical turning point for controlling corruption, 
especially when the latter has been present for a 
considerable period of time and has identified itself as 
a bad practice of the “institutional” state structure11. It 
is only the long and true democratic form of 
government, that is the establishment of a genuine 
democratic tradition, that proves to be of critical 
importance for tackling corruption. Only when 
democratic institutions have been consolidated we can 
argue convincingly that they reduce corruption. It 
could be accepted therefore that an important 
guarantee for crushing corruption is securing the 
smooth functioning of democratic institutions. 
                                                 
11 The control of corruption is extremely difficult when the 
phenomenon becomes institutionalized and is not 
considered spontaneous. Easterly (2001) was the first to 
distinguish corruption into spontaneous and 
institutionalized or systemic. 
Notions such as transparency, collectivism, rule of 
law etc., constitute but a few of the ingredients to a 
successful recipe of a smooth operation of a lawful 
state. It goes without saying that even in western 
type democracies one can encounter phenomena of 
institutional degradation in favor of personal gain. 
However, these take the form of economic scandals 
rather than large-scale corruption.  
The level of human development is the third 
variable that affects the degree of corruption in the
Mediterranean and Balkan region. Improving the 
quality of life and increasing the level of education 
reduces the motives of public officials to resort to 
corruption. These objectives however require the 
effective implementation of the appropriate long-run 
policies. 
 
3.2. Policy proposals 
From the above analysis we realize that improving 
government effectiveness by increasing the level of 
economic development and by establishing a more 
democratic political system and increasing the level of 
human development form the basic pillars of any 
anticorruption strategies in the Mediterranean and Balkan 
region, given its economic and political heterogeneity. 
As it can be realized from table 1, many 
Mediterranean and Balkan countries could be 
characterized as highly corrupted especially Libya, Syria, 
Lebanon, Kosovo and Algeria. These countries are also
characterized by low government effectiveness, by low
levels of political freedom, and with the exemption f 
Libya, by low levels of per capita income. The 
Mediterranean Sea forms a natural border between two 
worlds. The northern, on the one hand, that comprises the 
European countries and the southern and eastern on the 
other, that comprises the Arab countries, with the 
exceptions of Turkey, Israel, Cyprus and Malta. These two 
worlds present great socio-cultural and politico-ecnomic 
disparities. This very reality proves a challenge for the EU 
in its overall approach to the South East Mediterranean 
region. The EU from 1992 onwards12 has attempted to 
intervene politically in SE Mediterranean13. The 
establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Zone14, based on 
two pillars (namely, economy and culture), is estima ed 
that it will reduce the existing “prosperity gap” between 
the two regions15, and thus it will reduce the level of 
corruption. These are the lines along which the Euro-
                                                 
12 Culminating in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. 
13 Its main objective has been to bridge the gap in the 
socioeconomic sector, which in turn will lead to the
resolution of the greater part of the problems thatis 
region is facing (Sioussiouras, 2007). 
14 See further Sioussiouras (2003). 
15 See extensively Seimenis and Sioussiouras (2003).  
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Mediterranean partnership is actually moving 
(Sioussiouras and Vavouras, 2012).  
Corruption is also widespread in the Balkans where 
many countries are characterized by high unemployment 
rate, large hidden economy, organized crime, drugs 
proliferation, downgraded parliamentary institutions and 
migration (Dalaklis, Sioussiouras, and Karkazis, 2008). In 
some countries economic and political instability prevails. 
The existence of a regime of impunity that normally is 
well in place, contributes greatly in further strengthening 
corruption. It is not therefore surprising that a large part of 
the administrative mechanism in some Balkan countries 
does not function without the “contribution” of the 
necessary “supplement”. 
In 2003 a EU Commission report mentioned that 
extensive corruption levels in the Balkan countries 
constituted a serious obstacle to their economic reforms, 
with bleak prospects for their own future. Tax and social 
security revenues are seriously undermined, and all 
attempts to invest in many of those countries are made 
almost impossible (Sioussiouras, 2005). Given the fact 
that the majority of investment in the Balkan countries 
comes from the EU member-states, one could easily draw
the conclusion that EU’s role in the process towards the 
economic development and the political stabilization and 
hence to the reduction of corruption of the region is very 
important. The Stability Pact for South East Europe, which 
was put into effect in 1999, constitutes one serious step 
towards this direction16. The Initiative against Corruption 
that was included in the Pact provides the Balkan countries 
with the guidelines they need to follow17. The overall aim 
is the incremental incorporation of the Balkans into the 
European family of countries18.  
Generally, the Stability Pact for South East Europe 
and the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation Agreement 
constitute the two EU policies that are expected to 
contribute decisively to the effective reduction of 
corruption in the region, given the fact that they aim at 
strengthening the most important factors that improve 
government effectiveness, namely democratic institutions 
and economic development, as it has been shown in the 
present study. 
Since corruption finds fertile ground for growth in 
countries that find themselves in economic, political and 
social instability and underdevelopment, the more 
developed, democratic, unitary, concrete and stable the 
country is, the harder it becomes for phenomena that can 
paralyze state structures like corruption to prosper. On the 
contrary, countries that are characterized by low levels of 
economic development, by ethnic and cultural disparties 
                                                 
16 See www.seepad.org. 
17 See Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI). 
The creation of SPAI took place in February 2000 with the 
aim to fight corruption. The Council of Europe, the 
European Commission, the OSCE and the World Bank 
assist SPAI in implementing its aims. www.oecd.org/daf/ 
SPAIcom.    
18 See further Dalaklis and Sioussiouras (2007). 
and disputes, by persistent social inequalities and l ck of 
consolidated democratic institutions, can be very easily 
infiltrated by corruption.  
Finally, however, in a world that is more and more 
globalized it is natural that inter-state relations are 
increasingly taking the form of communicating vessel . 
Under these circumstances, corruption cannot always be 
solely attributed to inherent deficiencies of the existing 
political and economic systems. Imported factors might 
influence the level of corruption, especially in low income 
economies. In these countries corruption is sometimes 
taking gigantic proportions and due to the policies of 
developed states entrepreneurs who export illicit practices 
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